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Specialty license plates for automobiles, which publish
individual and special interest Free Speech, present a quagmire for the
courts when analyzed through the lens of the First Amendment's Free
Speech Clause. While citizens and groups can obtain personalized
license plates that publish both symbolic and written speech, state
governments often exercise strict editorial control over their license
plates. This regulatory scenario raises the dual questions of who is
speaking - the government or the private party - and how much
constitutional power the government has to engage in viewpoint
restriction in regulating that speech in this traditional government
forum. The United States Supreme Court has not heard any cases
addressing this unique forum. State and federal courts have used
several tests to decide this issue and have reached conflicting outcomes.
This lack of a uniform analytical framework to guide courts in
determining whether specialty license plates are private, government, or
hybrid speech allows a State to engage in what is likely impermissible
viewpoint restriction. Therefore, the courts must develop a clear test
that determines who is speaking in this forum and how much editorial
control the State has over the viewpoints that individuals and special
interest groups wish to publish in this forum.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1905, the State of Florida first required automobile owners to
place license plates on their vehicles.' Taxpayers paid the state a two-
dollar fee to register their vehicles and supplied the state with the ve-
hicle's description, registration number, horsepower, and make. In
return, the state provided the registrants with a paper registration
containing the registrant's license plate number. 2 The registrants then
made their own license plates out of paper, leather, wood, and other
materials since there were no laws or regulations that dictated the ma-
terial a registrant had to use to publish his vehicle's registration
status.3
In 1918, Florida began issuing its own license plates.4 In 1923,
Florida added the state's outline to its tags and in 1949, Florida began
adding slogans to its tags such as "The Sunshine State." In 1987,
1. DIANE NELSON, CFC, PINELLAS CouNTY TAx COLLECTOR, http://www.taxcollect.com/
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Florida authorized its first specialty license plate: The Challenger li-
cense plates. Over the decades, other specialty tags have followed,
including so-called "vanity tags" that allow registrants to personalize
their tags, whether a standard issue tag or a specialty tag, with words,
numbers, and even organizational symbols.6
Since 1987, Florida has opened this traditionally government
forum to specialty license plates for special interest groups, colleges
and universities, sports teams, and other special interests. Florida
currently has 123 specialty license plates.7 These specialty license
plates are revenue-generating symbols for the state. Exact figures are
not available for the monies these tags generate since the amount can
fluctuate from month-to-month according to a particular license plate's
popularity and the overall amount of license plates sold in a given
month, but these monies are split between the State and the license
plates' sponsoring organizations." Since 1986, Florida's specialty li-
cense plate program has raised over $500 million for the state. In 2011
alone, the organizations represented in Florida's 123 specialty plates
raised over $31 million.9
Despite a registrant's ability to personalize her license plate or
to purchase license plates to support various organizations, most peo-
ple do not think much about the license plate on their vehicles until it
comes time to pay the taxes due on them. Certainly, if one were to ask
most vehicle owners about the implications of vehicle license plates
and constitutionally protected speech, one might get more than a few
puzzled looks. Yet specialty license plates encompass both written and
symbolic speech.
When state governments allow individuals and organizations to
publish their messages on license plate tags, those license plates may
then become something other than a strict government forum. The
question, though, is whether this a purely traditional government fo-
rum in which the State can lawfully exercise viewpoint discrimination,
a public forum in which the State has but limited constitutional au-
thority to engage in viewpoint discrimination, or a hybrid of the two.
The United States Supreme Court has not decided a case that
addresses whether a State can engage in viewpoint restriction when it




9. Florida DHSMV, Florida Specialty License Plates, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF
HIGHWAY SAFETY MOTOR VEHICLES, http://www.myfloridaspecialtyplate.com/ (last visited
Apr. 29, 2012).
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lic for free speech purposes. This emergent area of law has resulted in
challenges from individuals and special interest groups such as the
pro-life and pro-choice factions, and as discussed below, the Sons of the
Confederate Veterans (SCV).
In 2008, the SCV applied for a Florida specialty tag-its pro-
posed "Confederate Heritage" license plate.10 The SCV satisfied the
statutory application requirements set forth in Florida Statute section
320.08053 for the creation of its specialty license plate." The proposed
plate contained five flags and two coat buttons issued to Confederate
troops from Florida, so the SCV's proposed license plate encompassed
both written and symbolic speech.12 The proposed license plate was
submitted to the Florida Legislature as Florida House Bill 1159.13
The Florida Legislature denied the SCV its specialty license
plate by not submitting the bill for legislative approval despite the
SCV's satisfaction of the statutory criteria required for a vote.14 Rich-
ard Glorioso, the then-Chairman of the House Infrastructure
Committee, refused to bring the bill for a vote based on his concern
that SCV's proposed license plate was "controversial."' 5 One Florida
Senator, Arthenia Joyner (D- Tampa), stated,
The Florida Legislature is too sophisticated to permit such a spe-
cialty tag. I don't think they'd fall into the trap of passing
legislation that raises the spectre (sic) of racism. It's a very sensi-
tive issue in this state and this country. It's very polarizing and we
don't need that today.' 6
This paper examines Florida's decision to deny the SCV its spe-
cialty license plate against the background of the First Amendment's
Free Speech Clause and the court's decision in Sons of Confederate
Soldiers Veterans v. Atwater (the "SCV court").' 7 The SCV challenged
the Florida Legislature's failure to enact Florida House Bill 1159 on
several grounds; however, this paper will focus exclusively on the
plaintiffs allegations of Free Speech Clause violations.' 8
10. Pl. Br. Summ. J. Sons of Confederate Soldiers Veterans v. Atwater, 2011 WL






16. HARDCORE CONFEDERATES, http://hardcoreconfederates.com/Specialty-plate.html
(last visited Feb. 28, 2012).
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Part I will discuss free speech case law regarding when a State
can constitutionally restrict speech. Part II will discuss the SCV's and
the State of Florida's positions and arguments in the SCV controversy.
Part III analyzes the SCV court's decision and how it reached its deci-
sion using the two-pronged test in Pleasant Grove City, Utah v.
Summum for determining whether monuments in public parks are pri-
vate or governmental speech.19 Part IV examines the four-prong test
that other courts have used in specialty license plate cases and ana-
lyzes the SCV case under those prongs. This section proposes that the
SCV court should have used a modification of the four-pronged test the
court used in Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. ex rel. Griffin v.
Comm'n of Va. Dep't of Motor Vehicles because the Griffin court's test
is more relevant to specialty license plate cases. 2 0 Part V concludes by
arguing that Florida must allow the SCV to have their own specialty
license plate because specialty license tags are a hybrid of private
speech and government speech. Therefore, whenever the State unilat-
erally and with unfettered discretion assigns its chosen meaning to
free speech and engages in viewpoint discrimination in the realm of
specialty license tags, it violates the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution.21
II. FREE SPEECH AND ITS LIMITATIONS
The First Amendment states, "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances."2 2 The SCV controversy concerns Florida's
perception of the SCV organization superimposed on the SCV's First
Amendment Free speech rights. The SCV's continuing legal controver-
sies share a common thread; in every state in which they have litigated
this issue, the case centers on the State's repression of unpopular ideas
coupled with a lack of judicial guidance that states and the courts can
use to decide the issue.
The Supreme Court has consistently supported states' ability to
suppress unpopular and potentially dangerous ideas. For example, in
Schenck v. United States, the Court ruled that the State could regulate
19. Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
20. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. ex rel. Griffin v. Comm'n of Va. Dep't of Motor
Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610 (4th Cir. 2002).
21. U.S. Const. amend. I, cl. 3.
22. Id. (emphasis added).
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speech when it presents a clear and present danger. 23 As Justice
Holmes famously stated, "The most stringent protection of free speech
would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and caus-
ing a panic. It does not even protect a man from an injunction against
uttering words that may have all the effect of force."24 Similarly, in
Abrams v. United States, the Court concluded that the government
could censor Free Speech when the defendants encouraged unlawful
action against the United States during wartime. The defendants were
convicted of sedition for their anti-government viewpoints because "the
defendants, in terms, plainly urged and advocated a resort to a general
strike of workers in ammunition factories for the purpose of curtailing
the production of ordnance and munitions necessary and essential to
the prosecution of the war as is charged in the fourth count."25 Justice
Holmes stated in his dissent that the First Amendment left no room for
the government suppression of dangerous ideas, except where a threat
was imminent, and that even unpopular ideas should be heard. 26
Likewise, in Chaplinsky v. State of N.H., the Court ruled that
the First Amendment does not protect lewd, obscene, or libelous
speech, or "fighting words." The Court reasoned, "It has been well ob-
served that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of
ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality."2 7 The question, of course, is who
should decide which ideas have such limited social value, such that the
state may censor them.
With freedom of speech comes a corresponding responsibility to
exercise that freedom appropriately. If a person utters or publishes
words that are dangerous in themselves, then the State can discrimi-
nate against those words. However, as Justice Brandeis famously
noted in his concurrence in Whitney v. California,
The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in de-
struction of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There
must be the probability of serious injury to the State. Among free
men, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent crime are
education and punishment for violations of the law, not abridgment
of the rights of free speech and assembly.28
23. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 249 (1919).
24. 249 U.S. 47 at 52 (citing Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 439).
25. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 622 (1919).
26. Id. at 630.
27. Chaplinsky v. State of N.H., 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
28. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 378 (1927).
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The State's powers to proscribe speech, however, are limited,
and mere fears of unpopular opinions cannot justify viewpoint restric-
tion even if those opinions might result in societal controversy or the
possibility of violence.29 To justify a viewpoint restriction, there must
be more than a tenuous nexus between the ideas the speaker is expres-
sing and the harm that the State fears might result.30 The Court has
recognized this concept in the evolution of its opinions from Schenck to
Whitney. Fear of controversy and public animus toward certain topics
and subjects does not justify government censorship of private
speech.31 For example, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District, where a school imposed sanctions on the plaintiffs for
wearing black armbands protesting the Vietnam War. The Court ruled
that the plaintiffs' armbands were symbolic Free Speech and could
only be reasonably regulated. 32 The public school feared that the black
armbands and the students' symbolic opposition to the Vietnam War
would incite violence; therefore, the school suspended any student it
caught wearing a black armband if the student refused to remove the
armband. The student could not return to school until he did so with-
out the armband.3 3 The Court stated, "In order for the State, in the
person of school officials, to justify prohibition of a particular expres-
sion of opinion, it must be able to show that its action was caused by
something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and un-
pleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.3 4
An example of how the Court has treated the suppression of un-
popular ideas expressed through symbolic speech is the Texas v.
Johnson case. In Johnson, the Court held that the State could not jus-
tify prosecuting Johnson when he burned an American flag. This
holding was based on the State's stated interests in preventing
breaches of peace or to preserve the flag as a symbol of nationhood and
national unity.35 The Court stated,
Expression may not be prohibited on the basis that an audience
that takes serious offense to the expression may disturb the peace,
since the government cannot assume that every expression of a pro-
vocative idea will incite a riot but must look to the actual




32. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
36. Id. at 398 (emphasis added).
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The Johnson Court's decision mandates that the First Amend-
ment's Free Speech Clause protects even the most unpopular of ideas,
even those that may arouse strong emotions in those who observe the
published speech - be it actual or symbolic Free Speech - when the gov-
ernment cannot prove that speech is not directed toward a specific
individual or individuals.37 In fact, the Court stated Johnson's actions
did not rise to the level of "fighting words" in his speech and could not
be curtailed under that doctrine. The Johnson case further illus-
trates the Court's continued reluctance to allow states to proscribe
unpopular and controversial private speech even if there is a danger it
could elicit strong negative and emotions and even civil unrest.
In Cohen v. California, the Court stated that anyone offended
by Cohen's jacket, which stated, "Fuck the Draft," had a duty to avert
their eyes rather than take personal offense at an impersonal mes-
sage. 9 The Court reached the same result in Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville when it struck down a Jacksonville, Florida ordinance
that prohibited nudity from being shown on drive-in movie screens
when that nudity could be seen from the roadways - no matter how
innocent or inadvertent that nudity might be.4 0 Even when spoken
words are combined with symbolic Free Speech to express abhorrent
ideas in the presence of others, it does not allow the State to proscribe
speech.4 1 In Street, the defendant burned a flag and stated to a police
officer and a gathering crowd, "We don't need no damned flag."42
In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court explicitly stated that even
advocating violence is not enough to proscribe speech. There must be
fear of imminent lawless action coupled with speech 43 - meaning that
abstract language and symbolism alone will not suffice to allow a state
to prohibit private speech. The danger must be concrete and brought
about by the speaker. 44 It is highly unlikely the Court would accept
arguments that a license tag sponsored by a disfavored group would
present such prohibited speech.
Groups that the vast majority of society regards as being abhor-
rent cannot be prevented from exercising their Free Speech rights. For
example, in Forsyth County, Ga v. The Nationalist Movement, the
37. Id.
38. Id. (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
39. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
40. Erznoznik v City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
41. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
42. Id. at 579.
43. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
44. Id.
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Court ruled that charging variable rates for parade permits amounted
to an unreasonable restriction of Free Speech, since the variable rates
showed the State was exercising impermissible viewpoint restriction
and favoring some groups' messages over the messages of disfavored
groups. 45
The SCV's continuing legal battles across the nation to obtain
specialty license plates for its organization pit the SCV's controversial
reputation against its desire to exercise its Free Speech rights in the
forum of State-issued specialty license plates. As Judge Kiser aptly
stated in Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Holcomb, "The contro-
versy regarding the Confederate flag has apparently invaded its
newest terrain, automobile license plate designs," when referring to
the SCV's litigation to get a specialty license plate with the SCV's Con-
federate flag symbol emblazoned on it.46 Cases involving the First
Amendment's Free Speech Clause involve situations in which the State
believes that certain speech is so controversial that it is likely-in the
State's opinion-to cause societal disorder or offend the public's
sensibilities.
The Court has held the First Amendment protects even hate
speech designed to embroil the public. Speech cannot be restricted sim-
ply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt, "because if there is a
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the gov-
ernment may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."4 7
Even if the State owns the forum, the State cannot use unfet-
tered discretion under the guise of protecting the public from
controversy to curtail Free Speech. There must be a limiting process to
guide the State in its decisions.4 8 Government proscription of speech
must be viewpoint neutral.49
45. Forsyth County, Ga. v. The Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992).
46. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Holcomb, 129 F. Supp. 2d 941 (W.D. Va.
2001).
47. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 1207 (2011) (citing Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414).
48. Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
49. Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v.
Martinez, 561 U.S. (2010).
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III. THE PARTIES' POSITIONS IN THE SCV CASE
A. The SCV's Position
The SCV's purpose is to celebrate ancestral pride in its mem-
bers' collective military and familial history. Its website states,
[T]he citizen-soldiers who fought for the Confederacy personified
the best qualities of America. The preservation of liberty and free-
dom was the motivating factor in the South's decision to fight the
Second American Revolution. The tenacity with which Confederate
soldiers fought underscored their belief in the rights guaranteed by
the Constitution. These attributes are the underpinning of our dem-
ocratic society and represent the foundation on which this nation
was built. Today, the Sons of Confederate Veterans is preserving
the history and legacy of these heroes, so future generations can
understand the motives that animated the Southern Cause.50
The SCV maintains that Florida was engaging in impermissible
and "unfettered" viewpoint discrimination due to what Florida re-
garded as the SCV's "controversial" proposed license plate, thereby
violating SCV's Free Speech rights in a public forum.5 1
The SCV contended that the Eleventh Circuit has already rec-
ognized specialty license plates as private speech that benefited the
sponsoring organization. Therefore, the State's right to proscribe pri-
vate speech and engage in viewpoint discrimination is highly restricted
and limited to matters of great state importance. In Women's Emerg.
Network v. Bush, the court held that Florida's "Choose Life" specialty
license plate was created for the benefit of the sponsoring "Pro Life"
organization, not Florida, and therefore, was not government speech.52
Additionally, SCV argued there has been only one specialty license
plate case that a court has held to be government speech. In that case,
the State of Tennessee initiated legislation to create a "Choose Life"
specialty tag and declined to sponsor an alternative viewpoint "Pro
Choice" tag.5 3
50. Sons Of Confederate Veterans, http://www.sev.org/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2012).
51. Supra note 9 (citing City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g, 486 U.S. 750, 764
(1988).
52. Women's Emerg. Network v. Bush, 323 F.3d 937 (11th Cir. 2003).
53. ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredeson, 441 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2005).
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B. Florida's Position
Florida argued it is under no obligation and cannot be com-
pelled to sponsor all speech in its forum of specialty license plates.5 4
Furthermore, Florida contended that it "speaks to the public through
its license plates" and exercises extreme editorial control over the
messages it publishes with those license plates.5 5 Therefore, no citizen
would be misled into believing that specialty license plates are any-
thing other than government speech in a government forum, and
persons who observe specialty plates would reasonably interpret them
as speaking for the State of Florida.56 Florida further argued that not
only does it have no duty to sponsor any viewpoint other than its own,
but in terms of practicality, since the purpose of a license plate is to
identify a vehicle, Florida cannot sponsor all viewpoints due to the in-
herent limitations of the alphanumeric system of identification.5 7 If
the court imposed on Florida a duty to sponsor all viewpoints, Florida
argued that the primary purpose of its tags - identification of motor
vehicles - would fail.5 8 Florida also argued that it is common knowl-
edge that the State issues the license plates on the back of vehicles,
and by extension, no one could reasonably believe that regular or spe-
cialty license plates are anything other than State speech. 59
Florida relied on two cases to support its position. In the first,
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, the Court found that although a cat-
tle association paid monies to the government, and the government
used those monies to promote a specific message, that message was
still government speech - despite the mixed funding - and the gov-
ernment was under no constitutional compulsion to sponsor an
alternative viewpoint.60
In the second case, Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, the
Court ruled that although private organizations had donated religious
monuments in a public park, States have traditionally spoken to the
public through such forums.61 Since the City exercised editorial con-
trol over the messages it sponsored, the resultant speech was





59. Defs. Br. Summ. 2010 WL 2750248. NO 43.
60. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, Annotiation, 544 U.S. 550, 565-66 (2005).
61. Supra note 19, at 481.
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government, not private, speech, despite the fact that private funds
were used to place those monuments.6 2
IV. THE SCV COURT's RULING
This part of the paper addresses the SCV court's decision and
analyze the factors that shaped its decision. The SCV court used a
two-part analysis that first examined how easily the public could iden-
tify the government as the speaker, and then examined how much
editorial control the government exercises over the messages in the fo-
rum in question.63
A. The Summum Analysis
The SCV court stated that the constitutionality of Florida's spe-
cialty license statutes turned on whether messages contained in the
specialty license plates constitute private speech, to which First
Amendment protections apply, or government speech, "which is ex-
empt from First Amendment scrutiny."64 The SCV court agreed with
Florida and held the Summum decision and its two-prong test was out-
come-determinative.
The Summum case involved a religious organization that de-
sired to place a religious monument in the Pleasant Grove City's public
park. The Court used a two-prong test to determine if monuments in
public parks are private or government speech.
In Summum, the respondents challenged the City's refusal to
place a permanent monument donated by Summum, a religious organi-
zation, in a public park. The 2.5-acre park already contained fifteen
such permanent displays, at least eleven of which were donated by pri-
vate groups or individuals. The City rejected the respondents'
monument because it did not comport with the City's policy of only ac-
cepting monuments that either "(1) directly relate [d] to the history of
[the city], or (2) were donated by groups with longstanding ties to the
community."65
The Court stated that in a public forum,
government entities are strictly limited in their ability to regulate
private speech in . . . 'traditional public fora.' Reasonable time,
62. Id.
63. Sons of Confederate Soldiers Veterans v. Atwater, 2011 WL 1233091 (M.D. Fla.
Mar. 30, 2011).
64. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005).
65. Supra note 19, at 465.
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place, and manner restrictions are allowed, but any restriction
based on the content of the speech must satisfy strict scrutiny, that
is, the restriction must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
government interest.66
Restrictions based on viewpoint are strictly prohibited.67
In addition to traditional public fora, the Supreme Court has
also recognized that a "government entity may create 'a designated
public forum' if government property that has not traditionally been
regarded as a public forum is intentionally opened up for that pur-
pose."68 Government speech restrictions in a designated public forum
are "subject to the same strict scrutiny as restrictions in a traditional
public forum."69
The question in Summum mirrors that in the SCV case. By al-
lowing the public to customize and publish messages in a traditional
State forum (in the SCV's case, specialty license tags), did the State
intentionally open that forum and create a designated public forum in
which the State has less ability to engage in viewpoint discrimination?
The Summum court noted that "[plermanent monuments dis-
played on public property typically represent government speech," and
noted two particularly relevant characteristics of permanent monu-
ments: How easily is the government identified as the speaker, and
how much editorial control does the government exercise over the mes-
sage?70 The Court used this two-prong test to determine whether the
monuments in the City's park constituted private or government
speech.71
B. The First Summum Prong: How Easily is the Government
Identified as the Speaker?
The first Summum prong examines whether the government is
clearly identifiable as the speaker. The Court held that public parks
are traditional government forums and the government traditionally
speaks to the public through monuments even though those monu-
ments are often donated by private parties. 72 This argument tracks
66. Id. at 469 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.
788, 800 (1985)).
67. Id.
68. Id. (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 470.
71. Id.
72. Supra note 19, at 461.
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closely with Florida's position that license tags are a traditional gov-
ernment forum.
In Wooley v. Maynard, the Court ruled that New Hampshire's
statute forbidding drivers from obscuring its "Live Free or Die" motto
on its vehicle license tags was unconstitutional forced speech that
turned personal automobiles into mobile bulletin boards advertising
the State's message.73 Maynard and his wife were Jehovah Witnesses
who disagreed with the State's motto on their vehicle's license tag and
obscured it." New Hampshire asserted that Maynard's covering of its
motto on its license plates interfered the state's ability to identify vehi-
cles, yet the Court disagreed and stated the motto was compelled State
speech that interfered with Maynard's First Amendment rights, and
that less-intrusive methods were available to accomplish the State's
purpose.75 The State "may not constitutionally require an individual
to participate in the dissemination of an ideological message by dis-
playing it on his private property in a manner and for the express
purpose that it be observed and read by the public." 76
By extension, the Maynard court's holding states that standard
license tag mottos are clearly government speech and the public cannot
be compelled to publish government speech with which it disagrees.
Florida's argument would appear to be much stronger under Sum-
mum's first prong where its standard tags are concerned since
registrants take what the State gives them, and the registrants have
no input into the messages published upon those tags; however, Flor-
ida's argument weakens when vanity and specialty tags are
implicated.
With vanity tags, the registrant speaks through alphanumeric
symbols, and Florida is not the sole speaker in the plethora of personal
speech published in vanity (or personalized) tags. Judicial notice can
be taken of how often those tags consist of registrants' names or even
cryptic messages with idiosyncratic meanings known only to the regis-
trants. Florida's argument further weakens when it comes to specialty
tags since Florida is allowing private speech of special interest groups
into its forum, and Florida cannot reasonably argue it is the sole
speaker through its NASCAR specialty tag, for example.77




77. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, NASCAR, http://
www.flhsmv.gov/dmv/specialtytags/miscellaneous/NASCAR.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2012).
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When vanity and specialty tags are analyzed as part of Florida's
statutory licensing scheme, Florida's argument that the public would
identify the State as the speaker is greatly weakened as the personal-
ization of its license plates increases.78 The SCV court noted on this
matter, "With more than 110 specialty plates available to Florida vehi-
cle owners, it is unlikely that the State of Florida would be identified
as the speaker communicating each of the messages contained in the
specialty plates."79 The SCV court ruled free speech was implicated
under this prong of the Summum analysis, and that a reasonable per-
son would not believe Florida was speaking through each of its
specialty tags.8 0 The Court stated, "when specialty license plates are
placed on private vehicles, there is little chance that observers will ap-
preciate the identity of the speaker as the government.81 The SCV
court reasoned that the more specialty license plate viewpoints a State
allows into its forum, the less likely it would be found to be government
speech.
C. The Second Summum Prong: How Much Editorial Control Does
The Government Exercise?
The second prong of the Summum test concerns the degree of
editorial control the State exercises over the message. In Summum,
the Court found the City exercised control over the messages its park
expressed by selecting which monuments it published within its park,
and by doing so, expressed its own viewpoints. States can say what
they want and express the viewpoints they desire even though public
funds are used to facilitate the expression of those viewpoints. 82 The
State is always entitled to make "value judgments" in messages it sup-
ports so long as its conduct comports with the Constitution.83
The Court held in Summum that the placement of a permanent
monument in a public park is government speech and is therefore not
subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause. The Court noted
that cities take extreme care and exercise great selectivity when plac-
ing monuments in public parks because those parks represent the
image those cities want to present to their residents, visitors, and the
78. When the author was a Florida police officer and specialty license plates emerged,
the State issued booklets identifying the State's license plates because law enforcement
officers were having difficulty determining if a vehicle's license plate was truly State-issued.
79. Sons of Confederate Veterans Soldiers, 2011 WL 1233091, at 6 (M.D. Fla.).
80. Id. (emphasis in original).
81. Id.
82. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562.
83. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977).
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rest of the world. This is the case even when private parties donate
those monuments. 84
Florida's position is much stronger under the second Summum
prong. Florida regulates every aspect of design, editorial content, pro-
duction, and distribution of its license plates. Florida license plates are
owned by the State. Moreover, Florida exercises control over their issu-
ance and distribution. Florida can also demand the return of any plates
it issues but later finds obscene and/or offensive.85 Florida regulates
every aspect of its license plates, from the tags' size, shape, and even
the amount of their nighttime reflectivity. 86
The SCV court also found this second prong fatal to Florida's
case: Florida exercised extensive control over the speech it was al-
lowing into its specialty license plate forum, yet because it did not have
any guidelines to control that discretion, the SCV court concluded that
Florida had exercised unfettered discretion and viewpoint discrimina-
tion over private speech.
The SCV court declined to determine what type of forum spe-
cialty license plates present, noting, "Because section 320.08053 fails
to prevent viewpoint discrimination, as discussed below, the statute is
unconstitutional in any public forum."87 The SCV court, by implication,
found the forum to be either a public or limited public forum - a
purely government forum would not have raised viewpoint discrimina-
tion issues. The SCV court's unwillingness to determine what type of
forum specialty license plates represent is typical of such cases, and
the Summum two-prong test does not sufficiently aid courts in making
that decision.88
D. Where the Summum Analysis Fails in the SCV Decision
Despite its favorable finding for the SCV organization, the SCV
court did not appear to take into consideration Florida's vehicle license
84. Pleasant Grove City, Utah, 555 U.S. at 461.
85. FIA. STAT. § 320.0805 (2009).
86. Florida requires by statute that its license plates have a ten-year lifespan due to
decreased reflectivity, and customers must get new tags ten years after their initial
issuance, demonstrating who owns the license plates and the extreme amount of control the
State exercises over its license plates in general. Sons of Confederate Soldiers Veterans,
2011 WNL 1233091 (citing §320.06, FiA. STAT.)
87. Sons of Confederate Soldiers Veterans, 2011 WL 1233091, at 7.
88. Jack Guggenheim & Jed Silversmith, Confederate License Plates at the
Constitutional Crossroads: Vanity Plates, Special Registration Organization Plates, Bumper
Stickers, Viewpoints, Vulgarity, and the First Amendment, 54 U. MIAMI L. REv. 563, 564
(2000).
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plate scheme as a whole and account for how Florida has opened its
license plate forum to the public. Its analysis would have benefited
from reviewing Florida's statutory license plate scheme rather than fo-
cusing solely on specialty license plates.
For example, registrants can check the Florida Department of
Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles ("DHSMV") website to determine
if a particular alphanumeric combination is in use by another regis-
trant. If not, then the registrant can print an application for the
registrant's desired message, take it to a local DHSMV office, and
purchase a tag with that message.89 This registration scheme is analo-
gous to a private citizen giving a speech in a section of a public park or
a musical group performing in a public park. The State may charge
non-discriminatory permit fees90 - similar to vehicle licensing fees -
and it can restrict free speech to a certain degree to avoid intimidation
and the threat of imminent violence. In Virginia v. Black, the Court
held that symbols - such as a burning cross - alone could not be
prima facie evidence of an illicit intent, and there must be a true intent
to cause imminent harm.9 1 The State, then, must show a nexus be-
tween the prohibited symbol or speech and its fears of imminent
violence. It is highly unlikely that Florida could show such a nexus
between a specialty license plate for a disfavored group and its fears of
controversy.
While the Summum two-prong test is easy to apply to monu-
ments in public parks, the specialty license plate forum is arguably
more complex since the messages are often very individual, diversified,
and contain mixed speech far beyond traditional government view-
points, Florida admitted in its trial brief that there are "obvious
differences" between public monuments and its vehicle license plates.
Florida, though, emphasized that government speaks to the public
through license vehicle plates and detailed the statutory process with
which special interest groups must comply in order to obtain legislative
approval of their proposed specialty license plates.92
The courts in previous specialty license plate cases, beginning
with Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm'r of the Va. Dep't of
Motor Vehicles ("Griffin"), used variations of a non-exhaustive four-
prong test to determine whether the messages published on specialty
89. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, https://services.
flhsmv.gov/MVCheckPersonalPlate/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2012).
90. See generally Forsyth Cnty., Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992).
91. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003).
92. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Fla. Div., Inc. v. Atwater, 2011 WL 123091 (M.D.
Fla. 2011).
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tags constituted government or private speech. Those prongs are (1)
the central purpose of the program in which the speech in question
occurs; (2) the degree of editorial control exercised by the government
or private entities over the content of the speech; (3) the identity of the
literal speaker; and (4) whether the government or the private entity
bears the ultimate responsibility for the content of the speech.93
V. THE GRIFFIN COURT'S FOUR PRONGED TEST
The next section will compare the SCV decision to the Griffin
case and argue why a hybrid Griffin test is superior to the Summum
two-prong test for specialty license plate cases. The Griffin court ana-
lyzed the central purpose of specialty license tags, the amount of
editorial control Virginia exercised over those tags, who the "literal
speaker" was, and who had the "ultimate responsibility" for the speech.
However, like the SCV court, the Griffin court did not include a forum
analysis prong, which limit's a court's ability to effectively determine
whether specialty license tags represent private or government speech.
A. The Central Purpose of Specialty License Tags
The Griffin case concerned the SCV's application to the State of
Virginia for a specialty license plate. Virginia allowed the SCV to have
a specialty license plate but did not allow the SCV to display a Confed-
erate flag on the SCV's Virginia specialty license plate.94
Virginia argued that the central purpose of its specialty license
plate program was government speech honoring the groups for whom
Virginia authorizes special plates. The SCV argued that the central
purpose of Virginia's specialty license plate program was to "allow indi-
viduals to display their association with and express their pride in the
messages or goals of the group for which a special plate is
authorized."95
The Griffin court disagreed with both Virginia and the SCV re-
garding the purpose of the program. It ruled that Virginia's specialty
license plate program was designed to generate revenue, and the court
noted that in the year 2000, the net revenue from special plates totaled
93. Griffin v. Comm'n of Va. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610 (4th Cir. 2002),
(citing Wells v. City and Cnty. of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1141 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 534
U.S. 997 (2001)).
94. Id. at 613.
95. Id. at 620.
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nearly $4.5 million.96 Additionally, the court noted since Virginia re-
quired registrants to prove they were members of certain groups before
they could purchase some specialty license plates, Virginia was not
honoring those groups. Rather, members of those groups who had spe-
cialty license plates were publishing individual free speech showing
affiliation with those groups.97
Florida engages in a similar revenue-sharing scheme under
§320.08053, Fla. Stat., that requires applicants for specialty license
plates to pay a fee "not more than $60,000"98 and submit a marketing
plan estimating the number of specialty license plates the special in-
terest group expects to sell. According to Carol Harwood, director of
marketing of specialty license plates for the Harbor Branch Oceano-
graphic Institute Foundation based in Fort Pierce, Florida's specialty
license plates generated $33.5 million in revenue for special interest
organizations in 2009 alone.99
The central purpose of license plates is to identify vehicles and
their owners.looAn analysis under the first Griffin prong shows Flor-
ida's central purpose in selling its specialty license plates is to generate
revenue, not engage in government speech. Florida cannot reasonably
argue that allowing more viewpoints into its specialty license plate fo-
rum would destroy the identifying properties of license plates, because
the central purpose of specialty plates is to generate revenue.
Additionally, the method of identifying vehicles and their own-
ers uses a combination of alphanumeric characters. The design of a
specialty license plate has no impact on the identification of a vehicle's
year, make, model, color or owner. The only apparent limitation is the
finite number of alphanumeric combinations that will fit on any given
plate design.
In Summum, the Court reasoned that opening the City's park to
all viewpoints would destroy its essential purpose since the 2.5-acre
park would be overrun with monuments.10 1 The "central purpose" ob-
servation was dicta and not part of the two-part Summum test -
unlike in Griffin. In the SCV case, though, analysis of the specialty
plate program's essential purpose would have aided the court in deter-
96. Id. at 619.
97. Id.
98. FLA. STAT. §320.08053(1)(b).
99. Ed Killer, Specialty license plates generate needed revenue, TCPALM http://www.
tcpalm.com/news/2009/sep/04/specialty-license-plates-generate-needed-revenue/ (last
visited May 6, 2012).
100. Griffin, supra note 19, at 619.
101. Pleasant City Grove, Utah, supra note 77, at 479-480.
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mining the type of forum at issue. As Griffin noted, payment for the
right to speak in a forum tends to show that individuals, rather than
the State, are speaking through specialty license
plates. 102Furthermore, the court found it curious that if the govern-
ment was speaking through specialty license plates it would charge
special interest groups for publishing government speech.103
B. Editorial Control
Griffin's editorial control prong mirrors the Summum editorial
control prong used by the SCV court in deciding its case; however, the
breadth of the analysis was different. While the SCV court focused on
the Florida Legislature's unfettered discretion in approving or denying
specialty license plate applications,1 0 4 the Griffin court analyzed Vir-
ginia's entire specialty license plate process. 105
In Griffin, Virginia claimed that it exercised strict editorial con-
trol over its specialty license plates.106 However, the court determined
that once an applicant for a specialty license plate submitted its de-
sign, Virginia exercised no editorial control over the proposed design
beyond acceptance or rejection.10 7 In fact, only one case was found in
which Virginia declined to issue a specific design, and the applicants in
that case did not challenge Virginia's decision.108 Moreover, the court
noted the following:
[T]he 'Special Plate Design Criteria' sent to plate sponsors contains
detailed instructions for ensuring that the design submitted by the
sponsor will conform to size and space requirements, but it does not
contain guidelines regarding the substantive content of the plates
or any indication of reasons, other than failure to comply with size
and space restrictions, that a special plate design might be
rejected.109
102. Griffin, supra note 73, at 620.
103. Id.
104. 2011 WL 1233091 at 8. Sons of Confederate Soldiers Veterans, Inc. v. Atwater, No.
6:09-cv-134-Orl-28KRS, 2011 WL 1233091, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2011).
105. Id. at 614.
106. Id. at 621 (arguing that its statutory discretion to approve or reject proposed
designs undersection 46.2-725(B)(3), Virginia Statutes, demonstrated that the State
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Thus, Griffin concluded that Virginia failed to exercise editorial control
since the private applicants were the ones who made the substantive
decisions concerning the contents of the specialty license plates.11-0
Conversely, the court in American Civil Liberties Union of Ten-
nessee v. Bredesen ("Bredesen") determined that the State of Tennessee
exercised ultimate editorial control over its "Choose Life" specialty li-
cense plate.-1 " Bredesen reasoned that Tennessee had the right to veto
all aspects of its design, exercised control over "every word" of their
specialty license plates, and essentially "crafted the message". 112
Thus, contrary to Griffin, Tennessee's editorial control over the con-
tents of its specialty license plates constituted government rather than
private speech.1 1 3
Application of Griffin's "editorial control" prong to the SCV case
reveals that Florida's control claim would not prevail. Similar to the
Virginia statute at issue in Griffin, section 320.08053(1)(a), Florida
Statutes,114 details the application process for submitting a proposed
specialty license plate as well as the measurement requirements, but
leaves the design and wording of the license plate to the applicant.115
Contrary to Bresdesen, Florida does not set the overall message com-
municated to the public. Moreover, while Florida exercises extensive
editorial control over its standard license plates, once an applicant pro-
poses to customize their prestige or specialty license plate Florida, like
Virginia, merely approves or disapproves the proposed plate de-
signs.116 Therefore, because the SCV case is far more analogous to
110. Id. See also Wells v. Denver, 257 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding that the
exercise of editorial control by private parties over government messages is more indicative
of private speech than government speech).
111. 441 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2006).
112. Id. at 376.
113. Id. The Bredesen court declined to use the Griffin test and instead relied upon
Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association, 544 U.S. 550 (2005). The Bredesen court stated
that mixing of private and public funds to promote a government message does not affect
the fact that a message is government speech. However, it is important to note that
Bredesen was decided pre-Summum, and it is not possible to determine if the court would
have reached the same conclusion post-Summum.
114. FLA. STAT. § 320.08053(1)(a) (2009), (requiring an organization seeking authoriza-
tion to establish a new license plate to submit "a request for the particular specialty license
plate being sought, describing the proposed specialty license plate in specific terms,
including a sample plate that conforms to the specifications set by the department and this
chapter, and that is in substantially final form.").
115. See id. See also FLORIDA HIGHWAY SAFETY MOTOR VEHICLES BASIC SPECIFICATIONS
FOR SPECIALTY LICENSE PLATES, http://www3.flhsmv.gov/DMV/ProcRS/RS-20.pdf (last
visited Apr. 7, 2013).
116. Sons of Confederate Soldiers Veterans, Inc. v. Atwater, 2011 WL 1233091, at 7
(M.D. Fla.)(March 30, 2011).
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Griffin than Bredesen, the Griffin court would find that speaker is the
private registrant rather than Florida who is exercising editorial con-
trol over the specialty license plates.
C. The Literal Speaker and Ultimate Responsibility
for Speech Prongs
The Griffin court next analyzed who the "literal speaker" was
and who bore the "ultimate responsibility" for the speech.117 The court
posited that discerning the literal speaker of license plates, and in par-
ticular specialty license plates, is a difficult task.1180ne reason for this
difficulty, the court stated, is that in license plate cases the license
plate itself is the literal speaker.119
In determining whether the government is the literal speaker
in a specialty license place cases, the Griffin court noted that "owner-
ship of the means of communication [is] a valid consideration." 12 0 In
Wells v. Denver, for example, in holding that a government sign consti-
tuted government speech, the court found it significant that the State
of Denver owned every part of the holiday display.121 Although private
corporate sponsors had contributed money towards the display, the
court ruled it was the government speaking through the government
sign. 122 Conversely, unlike the holiday display in Wells, a license plate
is attached to private property - a motor vehicle - and Griffin noted
that the Supreme Court has ruled that forcing the public to broadcast a
State's messages via vehicle license plates is a violation of an individ-
ual's free speech rights. 123 The Griffin court reasoned that although
there is no disputing the State is the owner of its vehicle license plates,
when a person attaches a license plate to his vehicle, this triggers free
speech concerns. 124 Since the license plate is the literal speaker, the
registrant can reject or adopt that speech as his own, but cannot consti-
tutionally be forced to publish it.125
117. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. ex rel. Griffin v. Comm'n of the Va. Dep't of
Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 621 (4th Cir. 2002).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. (citing Wells v. Denver, 257 F.3d 1132(10th Cir. 2001).
121. 257 F.3d 1132, 1150 (10th Cir. 2001).
122. Griffin, at 621.
123. Id. at 621 (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (holding that New
Hampshire violated the First Amendment rights of objecting drivers when it required them
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Conversely, Griffin's line of reasoning is conflicting in cases con-
cerning vanity plates with personalized messages created by the
registrant. For instance, in Perry v. McDonald,1 2 6 after Perry ordered a
personalized license plate that read "SHTHPNS," the State recalled it,
citing its offensive nature. 127 The court considered whether a restric-
tion on vanity plates that might be "offensive or confusing to the
general public" was a "government regulation concerning private indi-
viduals' speech on government-owned property."128 The court ruled
that the State could regulate vanity license plates since they are not
free speech, free speech, or government fora. Further, it reasoned that
the State had an interest in avoiding "scatological" and offensive refer-
ences, and there were no indications the State had opened its license
plate forum to the public.129 Interestingly, the Perry court did not men-
tion Wooley anywhere in its opinion. 130
A variety of factors explains the distinction between Griffin's
protection of specialty license plates and Perry's failure to protect van-
ity plates. With vanity plates, nominal monies are spent by a
registrant compared to the higher amount of money specialty license
plates cost to procure, the amounts of revenue they generate, and the
costs related to their customization. Thus, the sheer amount of money
an applicant expends and receives for publishing speech on a specialty
license plate and the amount of editorial control an applicant exercises
over the design of a specialty license plate is far more indicative of pri-
vate free speech.
In Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Holcomb,131 the court
examined these factors and held that while the State does speak
through vehicle plates, it does so only about official government mat-
ters. 132 Holcomb was dismissive of attempts to separate speech in
vanity plates from that of specialty plates, and stated, "It makes no
difference to the analysis whether this expression is conveyed via the
letters and numbers of CommuniPlates or the logos and emblems of
specialty plates."133 Other courts have reached similar conclusions. 134
126. Paula v. Perry, 280 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2001).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 170.
130. But see Pruitt v. Wilder, 840 F. Supp. 414, 418 (E.D. Vir. 1994) (holding State's
prohibition against the publishing of deities' names on State-issued personalized license
plates constitutes impermissible viewpoint restriction of motorists' free speech rights).
131. 129 F. Supp. 2d 941 (W.D. Va. 2001).
132. Id. at 943.
133. Id. at 945 (discussing Pruitt, 840 F. Supp. 414).
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If the "literal speaker" is the license plate, and the State owns
the license plate, then one must look to the messages the license plate
is publishing. This analysis indicates the State name, seal, motto and
other standard government identifiers are State speech, but when indi-
viduals and private organizations speak through vanity and specialty
plates, then the result is a mixture of State and private free speech.
Florida's argument in the SCV case that specialty license plates
are purely government speech is unpersuasive and would fail this
prong of the Griffin analysis when coupled with the Holcomb holding.
The more customization and influence the public has over such a gov-
ernment forum, the more likely the forum will tilt away from being a
purely government forum, and the more likely it is to implicate Free
Speech rights.
The Griffin court did not explicitly address the ultimate respon-
sibility for speech prong; rather, it combined its literal speaker and
ultimate responsibility analyses.135 However, the court stated the SCV
spoke through its specialty license plate, and the State merely pro-
vided the literal forum for that free .speech. Therefore, when the State
allows the public to express free speech within its forums, the State
cannot engage in viewpoint discrimination. 136 A better explanation of
this principle would be to determine who controls the speech. In the
case of specialty license plates, this would almost always be the special
interest group who designs, funds, and markets the specialty license
plates.
The court in Planned Parenthood of South Carolina Inc. v. Rose
applied the Griffin four-factor test and determined South Carolina's
specialty license plates are both government and private speech, and
viewpoint discrimination is prohibited in this context. The court analo-
gized specialty license plates to bumper stickers, reasoning a bumper
sticker expresses a vehicle owner's free speech no matter who manu-
factures the bumper sticker.13 7
134. See, e.g., Henderson v. Stalder, 112 F. Supp. 2d 589, 595 (E.D. La. 2000) (referring
to the premise that specialty license plates represent State speech as "an oxymoron" in
ruling that specialty license plates implicate private speech).
135. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. ex rel. Griffin v. Comm'n of the Va. Dep't of
Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 621 (4th Cir. 2002).
136. Id. at 622 (citing Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677
(1998)); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 805 (1985).
137. Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 794 (4th Cir. 2004).
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D. The Forum Analysis Prong
To ensure full consideration of constitutionally protected pri-
vate speech versus state speech in the specialty license plate forum,
the Griffin court's test must be modified to include a forum analysis.
The Holcomb court used an additional two-prong test to determine the
character of Virginia's specialty license plate program. The first prong
concerned government practice, and the second prong involved the
compatibility of the forum with the expressive activity sought to be
conducted there.13 8 Borrowing from another case unrelated to specialty
license plates provides the final prong, that of the reasonable
person. 3 9
Regarding the first prong, the court noted that Virginia had au-
thorized hundreds of specialty license plates for special interest
groups, including scores of fraternal, civic, and professional organiza-
tions. In addition, many of those special interest groups had taken
sensitive or controversial positions in the past.140
On the second prong, the court noted that Virginia residents
had paid additional fees for many years to purchase unique combina-
tions of alphanumeric characters to express ideas and personal
messages. The court concluded that both vanity and specialty license
plates were well suited to the expression of private speech. The court
reasoned the government's practice had opened a nontraditional forum
for the public's messages by allowing the public to publish its speech in
Virginia's vanity and specialty license plates - a forum especially
well-suited to this type of private speech.141
Yet another useful prong that courts should use in specialty li-
cense plate cases is the reasonable person standard the Court used in
Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette ("Pinette"). In Pi-
nette, the Ku Klux Klan wanted to erect a Latin cross on public
property, and the State denied the Ku Klux Klan's petition on the
grounds that the cross would cause entanglement issues with the Es-
tablishment Clause of the First Amendment. The Court stated that no
reasonable person would believe the state was endorsing religion based
upon the unattended Latin cross.142
138. Sons of Confederate Veterans, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 948.
139. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 755 (1995).
140. Sons of Confederate Veterans, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 948.
141. Id.
142. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 755.
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VI. PROPOSED MODIFIED GRIFFIN TEST
The Griffin court, like the SCV court, did not include a forum
analysis prong, yet forum analysis is necessary to determine when the
State can engage in content or even viewpoint discrimination, since the
forum dictates the State's rights.143 The additional two-prong test the
court used in Holcomb should be incorporated into the Griffin test.14 4
Additionally, the "reasonable person" standard the Court used Pinette
would add a final determinative prong in the specialty license plate
forum. 145
The Summum two-prong test that the SCV court used is not
well suited to the specialty license plate forum; however, the analogy of
a public park is eminently useful when determining whether free
speech exists within a State's specialty license plate program. Parks
are traditionally public property owned and maintained by the State.
When a visitor enters a public park, that visitor is generally aware of
the park's governmental nature. Most visitors would believe that any
monuments they encounter within the park are State-owned - even if
there is a plaque denoting the fact that a monument was donated by a
special interest group or an individual. However, when a visitor to a
park observes a speaker standing on a soapbox within that State park,
it is logical to assume that visitor would believe the speaker is exercis-
ing his First Amendment rights to free speech, despite the fact this
publication is occurring in a State-owned forum. Very few reasonable
people would assume that the State agrees with every speech pub-
lished within its park.
Florida has created a limited public forum with its specialty li-
cense plate program, and, by opening this traditional forum to the
public, Florida cannot engage in viewpoint discrimination no matter
how controversial Florida regards the SCV's reputation. Even de-
spised groups have free speech rights, and Florida must treat all
special interest groups the same. 146 Florida cannot stand on its claims
that the SCV is too controversial to be granted admission into Florida's
specialty license plate forum, since controversy is not a permissible
limiting factor under the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause.147
There is no conceivable nexus between the harm or controversy Florida
143. Perry Educ. . Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46-47 (1983).
144. Sons of Confederate Veterans, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 948.
145. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 515 U.S. at 755.
146. Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. Ark. State Highway & Transp. Dep't, 807 F. Supp.
1427, 1438 (W.D. Ark 1992).
147. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist,393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
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envisions by allowing the SCV a specialty license plate and the sym-
bolic speech the SCV's proposed license plate represents. Florida has
engaged in unfettered viewpoint discrimination by giving meaning to
the SCV's symbolic speech and the SCV organization itself. By doing
so, Florida has impermissibly assigned a meaning to the SCV without
justification. There is no evidence that the SCV is a racist organization
or that granting the SCV a specialty tag would result in imminent
harm. The evolution of the Court's opinions in free speech cases con-
firms that the State cannot proscribe such speech because the public
regards it as controversial.
Florida has declared a moratorium on creating new specialty
license plates until 2014. Florida has two choices at this point: the first
is not to create any new specialty license plates, and if Florida desires
to avoid controversy in this limited public forum, this would be the saf-
est choice. However, if Florida enacts a statute with clear legislative
guidelines for the approval of specialty license plates, then Florida
must allow the SCV and any other specialty group - no matter how
controversial - entry into Florida's specialty license plate forum.
Florida simply cannot engage in impermissible viewpoint dis-
crimination under the guise of avoiding controversy. Florida may
believe that avoiding controversial subjects is for the public good, but
as Justice Holmes stated, "The ultimate good desired is better reached
by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and
that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be
carried out."148 In the end, it is "the thought that we hate" that de-
serves the constitutional protection. 149
148. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 629 (1919).
149. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655, (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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